People v. Keta: The Search for Stolen Auto Parts--Warrantless Searches of Chop Shops in New York by Walsh, Paul R. & Ciampa, Felix A.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 6 
Issue 2 Volume 6, Spring 1991, Issue 2 Article 6 
March 1991 
People v. Keta: The Search for Stolen Auto Parts--Warrantless 
Searches of Chop Shops in New York 
Paul R. Walsh 
Felix A. Ciampa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Walsh, Paul R. and Ciampa, Felix A. (1991) "People v. Keta: The Search for Stolen Auto Parts--Warrantless 
Searches of Chop Shops in New York," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , 
Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol6/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PEOPLE v. KETA: THE SEARCH FOR
STOLEN AUTO PARTS
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CHOP
SHOPS IN NEW YORK
The fourth amendment' to the United States Constitution pro-
tects the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable2
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)). "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society." Id.;
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). "The overriding function of the fourth
amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State." Id. See generally E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME
COURT 1-10 (1975) (evolution and history of fourth amendment); Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974) (fourth amendment protects privacy
and freedom and is consistent with aims of free and open society) .
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See Burger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967)
(same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (same).
Scholars universally contend that the area of fourth amendment jurisprudence is confus-
ing and does not make sense. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra, at 349 ("For clarity and consis-
tency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful prod-
uct."); Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1289, 1310 (1981) ("The [Court's] approach is at best confusing."); Burkoff, When
is a Search not a "Search"? Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 515, 523-25
(1984). ("[T]here is, in 1984, unceasing, often vitriolic, controversy among and between
the justices of the Supreme Court over . . . the interpretation and application of fourth
amendment principles ... [Jiudicial doublethink is becoming commonplace in the Supreme
Court in this setting."); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Lim-
its of Lawyering, 48 IND. L. J. 329, 329 (1973) ("The fourth amendment cases are a mess!").
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979):
The test of reasonableness under the-Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need
for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search en-
tails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.
Id.; Ker, 374 U.S. at 33. "[Tlhe reasonableness of a search is ... [to be determined] by the
trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the 'fundamental
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search 3 and seizure.4 To effectuate this protection, due process
criteria' laid down by the fourth amendment and in opinions of this Court applying that
Amendment." Id. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (reasonableness
test is an objective one, made without inquiry into underlying motivations); Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1989) (despite absence of suspicion,
search may be reasonable where important governmental interest justifies the intrusion);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) ("The reasonableness depends on balance between
public interest and individual's right to personal security free from interference by police
officers."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("no ready test to determine reasonable-
ness other than balancing need to search or seize and invasion which search or seizure
entails"). See, e.g., United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir. 1978) (routine bor-
der search not unreasonable); United States v. Crain, 485 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973)
(airport search of luggage pursuant to anti-hijacking program not unreasonable); United
States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1186 (9th Cir. 1973) (warrantless search of home per se
unreasonable); Nakamota v. Fasi, 64 Haw. 17, 26, 635 P.2d 946, 954 (1981) (mandatory
search of concert patron to detect concealed' bottles of alcohol was unreasonable). See gener-
ally GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at 40-41. "What is 'unreasonable' or 'reasonable' is a question
of informed judgment which will inevitably be affected as the facts shift, and will likewise
vary according to the outlook of the particular judge or Justice who has to consider the
question." Id.
S See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). "A 'search' occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." Id.;
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). "[I]f the inspection by police does not in-
trude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no search .... " Id.; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected." Id.
Various procedures have been held to constitute a search. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (picking up stereo turntable and looking at serial number on bot-
tom was "search"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (blood test consti-
tutes "search" within meaning of fourth amendment); United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (airport x-ray scan of defendant's briefcase was "search" within
meaning of fourth amendment).
However, numerous other procedures have not been held to constitute a "search" under
the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-03 (1987) (peer-
ing into barn with flash light to see illicit drug lab not "search"); Dow Chemical Co., v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (taking high resolution aerial photos of open air
chemical plant not "search"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (trained
narcotics detection dog sniffing traveler's luggage in public place not "search"); United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 (1980) (compulsory handwriting sample requested by
IRS not "search"). See generally J. WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.6 (2d ed. Supp.
1988) (examples of conduct constituting "search" within meaning of fourth amendment);
Burkoff, supra note 1 (discussing ambiguous and arbitrary interpretation of "search" in
context of fourth amendment); Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of
"Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IowA L. REV. 541 (1988)
(advocating use of common sense interpretation of "search" to make fourth amendment
jurisprudence comprehensible).
' See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). "A seizure occurs 'when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in the property seized." Id.; United States v. Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). A seizure occurs when "in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
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generally requires police officers to obtain a warrant before a
valid search may be conducted.8 With respect to commercial
premises,6 there exists an exception to the warrant requirement7
free to leave." Id.; United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. 1982) (implicit
constraints on individual's freedom constitute "seizure"). See, e.g., Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (police use of stationary roadblock to stop fleeing suspect
remanded for determination if seizure was unreasonable); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 7 (1985) (use of deadly force by policeman to stop fleeing criminal not "seizure"); State
v. Little, 468 A.2d 615, 617-18 (Me. 1983) (field sobriety test is "seizure"); In re Multi-
Vehicle Accident, 135 N.J. Super. 190, 195, 342 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1975) (taking paint scrapings from truck exterior constitutes "seizure"); People v. Phillips,
119 App. Div. 2d 773, 774, 501 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (2d Dept. 1986) (blocking path of
suspect's car with police car is "seizure"); Gordon v. State, 640 S.W.2d 743, 753 (Tex. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1982) (photographing exposed area is not "seizure"); State v. Ng, 104
Wash. 2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d 63, 67 (1985) (impounding room by stationing officer outside
door is "seizure"). See generally J. WESLEY HALL, JR., supra note 3, § 1.7 (examples of con-
duct constituting "seizure"); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 116-19
(1982) (discussing question of what is bad faith "seizure").
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). "[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ...." Id.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (strong preference for warrant as
safeguard against improper searches); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
("searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of judge or mag-
istrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 106-07 (1965) (with limited exceptions, searches and seizures can be undertaken only
after obtaining warrant); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (to allow
police searches without warrant would nullify safeguards of fourth amendment). But see
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist has characterized the Court's preference for warrants as "judicially created" and has
argued that "nothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted
pursuant to warrants." Id. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing fourth amendment warrant require-
ment); Bloom, The Supreme Court and its Purported Preference for Search Warrants, 50 TENN.
L. REv. 231 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court's approach to warrant requirement).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329, 1333 (1st Cir. 1974) (regulatory
inspections of tavern); United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2d
Cir. 1974) (pharmacy); United States v. Ciaccio, 356 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D. Md. 1972)
(night club); People v. White, 259 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 936, 940, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923, 927
(1968) (convalescent hospital); Lanchester v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n,
325 A.2d 648, 653 (Pa. 1974) (vehicle on racetrack).
I New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1987). In Burger, the Supreme Court sum-
marized the closely regulated industry exception holding that automobile junkyards were a
closely regulated industry and the statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches
was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id.
The evolution of the closely regulated industry exception was developed and refined by
the Court in a series of cases beginning with See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), in
which the Court concluded that fourth amendment protections applied to commercial, as
well as residential, premises. Id. at 543, 546. This conclusion was based on the rationale
that the businessman had a right to conduct his business free from unreasonable entries
upon his private commercial property. Id. at 543. However, the Court expressly declined
to espouse the boundaries of fourth amendment protection and left untouched the area
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for certain administrative inspections of closely regulated indus-
tries.' These warrantless, administrative inspections must, how-
regarding "such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require in-
spection prior to operating a business or marketing a product." Id. at 546. Thus, it ap-
peared that while See would not be applied to all business inspections, the scope of its appli-
cation remained undefined. Id. at 546; see generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.2(a), 631 (2d ed. 1987) (development of admin-
istrative search exception to warrant requirement).
Three years after the decision in See, the Court decided Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), which held warrantless search of a liquor store unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 77. However, the Colonnade Court recognized the constitutionality of war-
rantless searches in industries such as the liquor industry that had been "long subject to
close supervision and inspection." Id. The Court implied that a warrantless search made
pursuant to a congressional statute setting forth specific rules to guide the agent as to the
permissible scope of the search may be constitutional. Id. See generally Comment, Warrant-
less Searches of Commercial Premises: An Unwarranted Intrusion, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 505
(1987) (ramifications of Colonnade).
Colonnade was applied to firearms trafficking two years later in United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972), when the Court deemed unconstitutional a warrantless search of a
pawnshop pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317. The Biswell
Court reasoned that warrantless inspections constituted a crucial part of the regulatory
scheme involved, and held that the legality of a search depended on the authority of a valid
statute which would pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of pri-
vacy. Id. at 315-16. To ensure proper enforcement of the law and effective inspection,
warrantless inspections must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the fourth
amendment. Id at 316. While recognizing the fact that firearms trafficking lacked the long
history of governmental regulation associated with the liquor industry, the Court held that
"close scrutiny of this traffic [was] undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to
prevent violent crime and assist the states in regulating the firearms traffic within their
borders" and therefore was a justified intrusion. Id. at 315.
The Supreme Court in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), put to rest any specula-
tion that the closely regulated industry exception would be limited to the firearms and
liquor industries. See Comment, supra, at 508. In Dewey, the Court held that the warrantless
inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act did not violate the fourth amend-
ment. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 602. The Dewey Court interpreted Biswell and Colonnade to mean
that no warrant may be constitutionally required when Congress reasonably determines
that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and that scheme is
sufficiently comprehensive and defined to give the owner of commercial property notice
that his property will be subject to periodic inspections for a specific purpose. Id. at 600;
Comment, supra, at 509. The Court, largely due to the decision in Burger, 482 U.S. at 691,
has been criticized for making administrative searches the rule, rather than the exception.
See Burger, 482 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("warrant requirement is the excep-
tion not the rule"); J. WESLEY HALL, supra note 3, § 11:5.1 (government can now impose
warrant exception on almost any industry simply by regulating it).
" See Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-12 (administrative search of automobile junkyards does not
require warrant); Dewey, 452 U.S. at 606 (administrative inspection of underground and
surface mines requires no warrant); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317 (administrative search of fire-
arms dealer's storeroom does not require warrant); Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77 (administra-
tive searches in liquor industry require no warrant).
There are numerous cases in which fire, health, and safety inspections have required a
valid search warrant. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291 (1984) (administrative
search of residences to investigate cause of fire requires warrant); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
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ever, be "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 9 Administra-
tive inspections have been justified on the theory that there is a
reduced expectation of privacy'0 within commercial premises cou-
pled with the government's heightened interest in regulating the
particular business."
In New York v. Burger,'2 the United States Supreme Court held
that a warrantless search made pursuant to section 415-a(5)(a) of
New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL"), 3 which authorizes
administrative inspections of automobile junkyards, 4 commonly
referred to as "chop shops," was not violative of the fourth
amendment. 5 Recently, in People v. Keta, ' the Appellate Division
U.S. 499, 508-11 (1978) (administrative search of commercial premises to investigate cause
of fire requires warrant); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-24 (1978) (adminis-
trative search of commercial premises for safety inspection requires warrant).
I Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. A warrantless inspection of a closely regulated business will
only be deemed "reasonable" under the fourth amendment when three criteria are met:
First, there must be a 'substantial' government interest that informs the regulatory
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made. Second, the warrantless inspec-
tions 'must be necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.' Finally, 'the statute's
inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must]
provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'
Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted).
10 Id. at 702. "Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a 'closely regu-
lated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness
for a government search . . .have lessened application in this context." Id. See Dewey, 452
U.S. at 598-99 (owner of commercial property has lesser expectation of privacy than that
accorded individual's home); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (warrantless inspections under Gun
Control Act only limited threat to dealer's justifiable expectation of privacy). See generally
LAFAVE, supra note 7, §10.2 (warrant exception for administrative inspections).
" Burger, 482 U.S. at 702. See, e.g., Dewey, 452 U.S. at 602 (substantial federal interest in
improving health and safety conditions of underground surface mines); Biswell, 406 U.S at
315 (close scrutiny of firearms trafficking crucial to federal effort to prevent violent crimes
and regulate firearms traffic); Lovgren v. Byrne, 787 F.2d 857, 866 (3d Cir. 1986) (Con-
gress clearly articulated strong federal interest in protecting natural resources within Fish-
ery Conservation Zone); Rush v. O'Bledo, 756 F.2d 713, 723 (9th Cir. 1985) ("state has a
vital governmental interest in the protection of children which is furthered by warrantless
inspections" of family day care homes).
' 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
" See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986).
" Id. This statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any police officer and during his
regular and usual business hours, a vehicle dismantler shall produce such records
and permit said agent or police officer to examine them and any vehicle or parts of
vehicles which are subject to the record keeping requirements of this section and
which are on the premises.
Id.
'5 Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-12. The defendant in Burger was the owner of an automobile
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of the Supreme Court for the State of New York, Second Depart-
ment, was asked to determine whether section 415-a(5)(a), satis-
fied the search and seizure requirements of the New York State
Constitution."7 In upholding the constitutionality of section 415-
a(5)(a), the second department concluded that the New York Con-
stitution does not require greater rights than those guaranteed to
junkyard. Id. at 693. On November 17, 1982, five members of the Auto Crimes Division of
the New York City Police Department entered the defendant's junkyard to conduct an
inspection pursuant to section 415-a(5) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Id. at 693-94. The
officers requested to see Burger's license and "police book," both of which he was required
to maintain. Id. at 694-95. Burger replied that he had neither the license nor a police
book. Id. at 695. The officers then conducted an inspection pursuant to VTL § 415-a(5)
whereby the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs) of several vehicles and various auto
parts were checked against a police computer. Id. After checking the VINs and determin-
ing that Burger was in possession of stolen parts, he "was arrested and charged with five
counts of possession of stolen property and one count of unregistered operation as a vehi-
cle dismantler, in violation of VTL § 415-a(1)." Id. at 695-96. Burger moved to suppress
the evidence obtained as a result of the inspection on the ground that VTL § 415-a(5) was
unconstitutional. Id. at 696. The hearing court determined that VTL § 415-a(5) was consti-
tutional and denied the motion. Id. at 696-97. The appellate division affirmed. Id. at 697.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "§415-a(5) violated the fourth
amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. See People v. Burger,
67 N.Y.2d 338, 340, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691
(1987). The court of appeals believed that "the fundamental defect [of section 415-a(5)]
. ..is that [it] authorizes searches undertaken soley to uncover evidence of criminality and
not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme." Id. at 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 705.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals and upheld
the constitutionality of VTL § 415-a(5). Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-12. Initially, the Court
determined that the junkyard business, part of which includes vehicle dismantling, is a
closely regulated industry in New York. Id. at 703-04. "Accordingly, in light of the regula-
tory framework governing [the junkyard] business .. .[the] operator of a junkyard engag-
ing in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy. ... Id. at 707. The
Court found that "a State can address a major social problem both by way of an administra-
tive scheme and through penal sanctions." Id. at 712 (emphasis in original). "Administra-
tive statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social
problem, .but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different methods of
addressing the problem." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that "[a] search
conducted pursuant to [VTL] § 415-a(5) ... . clearly falls within the well-established excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of 'closely regulated' busi-
ness." Id. at 712.
11 People v. Keta, 165 App. Div. 2d. 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dept. 1991).
17 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §12. Section 12 provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Id. New York's search and seizure provision is identical to the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. See supra note 1 (text of fourth amendment).
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the citizens of New York under the fourth amendment.' 8 Addi-
tionally, the court found that the statutory scheme of section 415-
a(5)(a) is sufficiently definite in scope and reasonably limits the dis-
cretion of inspecting officers. 19
In Keta, the defendant, George Keta, was the owner and opera-
tor of a vehicle dismantling yard located in Queens County.20
During business hours, members of the Automobile Crime Divi-
sion of the New York City Police Department entered Keta's of-
fice, identified themselves as police officers and announced that
they intended to perform an administrative inspection pursuant -to
section 415-a(5)(a).2 ' The officers requested, and Keta produced,
the vehicle dismantler's license22 along with various statutorily re-
quired New York City permits. 3 Thereafter, the officers walked
through Keta's junkyard, randomly writing down vehicle identifi-
cation numbers ("VINs") from car parts stored in the yard.2" Af-
ter checking the VINs on the computer located in their patrol car,
the officers discovered that some of the parts had come from sto-
len automobiles.2 " Following the computer check, the police ex-
amined Keta's "police book" and found that Keta's auto parts
'0 Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 180-81, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
1 Id. at 182, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711-12
(1987)).
20 Id. at 174, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739. Keta's vehicle dismantling yard operated under the
name Jimmy-Son. Id.
21 Id. See supra note 13 (setting forth text of VTL § 415-a(5)(a)). The majority found
that the police randomly selected Keta's yard for an administrative inspection. Id. at 174-
75, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739. However, the dissent argued that the origin of the inspection was
planned and the goal was to uncover Penal Code violations by Keta. Id. at 185, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 745-46 (Harwood, J., dissenting).
" Keta, at 174, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a(l) (McKinney
1986). Anyone operating a vehicle dismantling business in New York is required to be
registered:
Definition and registration of vehicle dismantlers. A vehicle dismantler is any person
who is engaged in the business of acquiring motor vehicles or trailers for the pur-
pose of dismantling the same for parts or reselling such vehicles as scrap. No person
shall engage in the business of or operate as a vehicle dismantler unless there shall
have been issued to him a registration in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion. A violation of this subdivision shall be a class E felony.
Id.
" Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 174, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
" Id. at 174-75, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
2 Id. at 175, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739. A computer indication that a part was stolen is com-
monly termed a "hit." Id.
' N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986). The statute requires owners
and operators of chop shops to record the purchase of vehicle parts in a so-called "police
363
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were not inventoried in accordance with the regulatory scheme.2 7
Keta was then arrested. 8
The Supreme Court, Queens County, subsequently granted
Keta's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
search.29 The court determined that section 415-a(5)(a) violated
article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution. The court
book:"
[E]very person required to be registered pursuant to this section shall maintain a
record of all motor vehicles, trailers, and major component parts thereof . . . and
shall maintain proof of ownership for any motor vehicle, trailer or major component
part thereof while in his possession. Such records shall be maintained in a manner
and form prescribed by the commissioner ....
Id.
'7 Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 175, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
S Id. The police then obtained a search warrant, searched Keta's yard and discovered
more stolen car parts. Id. The dissent raised the contention that it was irrelevant that Keta
was not arrested until after the police officers had examined his police book and ascer-
tained that the stolen auto parts in his possession had not been inventoried in compliance
with the statute. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (Harwood, J., dissenting). Justice Har-
wood argued that this fact did not change the end result that the inspection served only to
uncover evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
The majority argued the conduct of the police officers in first requesting Keta's "police
book," then randomly checking the VINs of selected auto parts, and finally re-examining
Keta's "police book" to ascertain whether the proper entries had been made "amply estab-
lishe[d] the administrative character of the [inspection] and undermine[d] the suggestion
that [Keta] was subjected to an inspection motivated solely by a desire.to uncover evidence
of Penal Law violations." Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 182-83, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
The majority noted that the police officers' conduct in properly obtaining a search war-
rant before conducting a more thorough search of Keta's yard further illustrated the ad-
ministrative nature of the initial inspection. Id. Keta was also indicted for possession of
burglar's tools. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (Harwood, J., dissenting). Justice Harwood
found it interesting that this crime concerned items that were not within the purview of
the statutory inspection scheme. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46. See also New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 723 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (police removed identification
numbers from walker and wheelchair, although neither fell within permissible administra-
tive search).
" People v. Keta, 142 Misc. 2d 986, 994, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417, 423 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1989). "[T]he search conducted by the police pursuant to a search warrant [was
the] by-product of the illegal search and seizure and must be suppressed as fruits of the
poisonous tree." Id.
30 Id. at 994, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The Supreme Court for the County of Queens relied
heavily on the New York Court of Appeals' conclusion in People v. Burger that the funda-
mental defect with section 415-a(5)(a) was that it authorized searches undertaken solely to
uncover evidence of criminal activity and not to enforce any comprehensive regulatory
scheme. Keta, 142 Misc. 2d 986, 991-92, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1989). Contra People v. Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d 737, 547 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1989). The Tinneny court disagreed with the findings of the Keta court and
held that VTL § 415-a(5)(a) was constitutional. Id. at 741, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 801. The Tin-
neny court applied a balancing test for warrantless inspections in "closely regulated" indus-
tries. Id. In balancing a person's privacy expectations within commercial premises with
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reasoned that past New York Court of Appeals' decisions inter-
preting article I, section 12 demonstrated New York's inclination
to expand the rights of its citizens rather than to rely on more
narrowly interpreted fourth amendment grounds."
The appellate division, second department, reversed the
Queens County Supreme Court. 2 Writing for the majority, Judge
Kooper admonished the trial court for encroaching upon the pol-
icy and rule-making functions of the court of appeals. 3 The ma-
jority analyzed the considerations that have traditionally affected
the court of appeals' decisions to depart from constitutional stan-
dards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court under the
fourth amendment, 3' and concluded that an expansive construc-
tion of New York's Constitution was not warranted under the cir-
cumstances. 5 Additionally, the majority reasoned that the United
New York's desire to control the automobile dismantling industry, the Tinneny court con-
cluded that VTL § 415-a(5)(a) was constitutional. Id. The court believed that it was obvious
that the "type of search at issue [was] the most effective way to discover abuses in the
[chop-shop] industry." Id.
" Keta, 142 Misc. 2d at 992-94, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 421-23. The Supreme Court for the
County of Queens relied on only two New York Court of Appeals decisions to conclude
that New York courts are inclined to augment their citizens' privacy rights based on article
I, § 12. Id. One case, People v. Burger, was dismissed without comment, while the second
case, People v. Class, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, in New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). Id.
3 Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 174, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
33 Id. at 178, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741. Justice Kooper argued that deference must be given
to the court of appeals as New York's policy-making tribunal when a court seeks to deter-
mine if a greater right exists under the New York State Constitution. Id. "[T]he Court of
Appeals is best suited to effectively weigh the policy concerns which must be considered in
order to determine whether the recognition of a separate right under the state constitution
is, in fact, required." Id.
Justice Harwood disagreed with the majority's suggestion that it should reverse the trial
court "primarily as a matter of 'deference to the Court of Appeals' ". Id. at 184, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 745 (Harwood, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Kooper). In Justice Harwood's
view, where "an issue of state constitutional law is raised and presented in a proper proce-
dural posture, a court called upon to address the merits is bound to do so." Id.
34 Id. at 179, 567 N.Y.S.2d 742. There are three circumstances under which the court
of appeals has chosen to depart from Supreme Court decisions when interpreting the New
York Constitution: (1) where the court has decided to maintain existing New York law or
"because the Supreme Court has retreated from previously announced rules"; (2) "to es-
tablish a more protective state right by constitutionalizing a prior fully developed common
law right" or; (3) because the court has found "a separate State rule justified by concerns
peculiar to New York State residents". Id. (quoting People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 83,
555 N.E.2d 915, 924, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 527 (1990) (Simons, J., concurring).
Il Keta, at 179, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 742. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 704, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (1991) (right to counsel protected more zeal-
ously in New York than in other states or under federal constitution); Patchogue-Medford
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States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Burger 6 did not
represent a doctrinal departure from previous cases involving the
closely regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement.37
Writing for the dissent, Judge Harwood maintained that the
right at issue warranted greater protection under the New York
Constitution. 8 The dissent further argued that "New York's long
tradition of interpreting its constitution to protect individuals,"
particularly in the area of citizen-police encounters, warranted a
higher level of protection than that afforded by the fourth amend-
ment. 9 It concluded that the inspections authorized by section
415-a(5)(a) did nothing more than enable police to "ferret out
crime. '"40
This Comment will examine whether the appellate division's de-
cision in Keta comports with the Supreme Court's fourth amend-
ment test for warrantless searches pursuant to administrative stat-
utes. First, the Comment will explore the necessary initial
determination of whether chop shops are a closely regulated in-
dustry in New York. It will further examine whether the statute
meets the three criteria necessary for its validity, namely, whether
the statute advances a substantial governmental interest, whether
the warrantless search furthers that governmental interest, and
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist.,
70 N.Y.2d 57, 66-71, 510 N.E.2d 325, 328-31, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459-63 (1987)
(mandatory urine testing of public school teachers violates New York and federal prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures). The majority argued that the provisions
of VTL § 415-a(5)(a) did not implicate a "peculiar State or local concern" nor were the
rights of "chop shop" owners historically accorded greater protection under the state con-
stitution. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 180, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 743. In addition, the majority refused
to acknowledge the existence of a unique New York attitude that might warrant the exten-
sion of additional constitutional protection to those engaged in the "chop shop" business.
Id.
3 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
31 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (development of "closely regulated" industry
exception).
N Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 184, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 745 (Harwood, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Harwood, a finding that VTL § 415-a(5)(a) was unconstitutional would have
amounted to "a refusal to carve out an additional exception to long recognized constitu-
tional principles governing police conduct . I..." Id. at 188, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Justice
Harwood did not view the issue as whether additional constitutional protection should be
extended to chop shop owners. Id. Instead, his main argument was that the Burger Court
overturned established Supreme Court precedent that "warrantless administrative searches
are unlawful when used to uncover evidence of criminality." Id.
I d. at 188-89, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.
40 Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
366
Vol. 6: 357, 1991
People v. Keta
whether the statute provides an adequate and valid substitute for
a warrant. Finally, this Comment will address whether the New
York Constitution grants expanded privacy protection to chop
shop owners under independent and adequate state grounds.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS CRITERIA
A. Chop Shops - A "Closely Regulated" Industry
Before analyzing section 415-a(5)(a) to determine whether it
falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for adminis-
trative inspections,41 a determination must be made as to whether
chop shops are a closely regulated industry in New York.' The
chop shop industry has long been subject to governmental super-
vision and inspection.' The New York Legislature has found that
"the crimes of possession of stolen property in general and stolen
automobile parts, in particular," are pervasive in the chop shop
industry."" Former Governor Carey recognized that the increasing
rate of motor vehicle theft in New York State had become a seri-
4' See supra note 7 (case law leading up to administrative search exception to warrant
requirement).
41 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-07 (1987) (before discussing reasonable-
ness test, determination of closely regulated business is made).
4 See id. at 706 (automobile-junkyard business is new branch of second hand shop in-
dustry which has been closely regulated for many years); Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 180, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 743 (courts virtually unanimous concluding vehicle dismantling industry has
been subject to pervasive regulation); People v. Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d 737, 741, 547
N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1989) (same). People v. Pace, 101 App.
Div. 2d 336, 342-43, 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 448 (2d Dept. 1984) (Mangano, J., dissenting)
(same), af'd, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985). See also Project,
Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedures: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEo. L.J. 699, 781 (1990) (same). Contra Comment, The Junking of the,
Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. Krull and New York v. Burger, 63 TUL L. REv. 335, 365
(1988) (criticizing Burger analogy between chop shops and second-hand shops stating chop
shop industry was only recently regulated).
4 Pace, 101 A.D.2d at 343, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 448. See Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 187, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 748 (Harwood, J., dissenting). The New York State legislature found that the
chop shop industry was involved in the lucrative trade of stolen automobiles and parts. Id.;
People v. Brogante, 131 Misc. 2d 708, 711, 501 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1986) ("many junkyards, body shops and dismantlers are little more than fronts or essential
elements of stolen car rings and insurance fraud schemes"); People v. Ost, 127 Misc. 2d
183, 187, 485 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (common knowledge that
there are many stolen car operations and that many stolen cars go to chop shops to be used
for parts), af'd, 121 A.D.2d 571, 503 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dept. 1986); People v. Tinneny,
99 Misc. 2d 962, 966, 417 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979) (chop shops
industry "prone to criminal improprieties").
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ous social and economic problem for the citizens of the state."' In
response, the legislature amended section 415-a(5) to diminish
traffic in stolen vehicles and parts, thereby reducing costs to insur-
ance companies and the public."6 The provisions enacted by the
legislature precluded an individual from engaging in the chop
shop business in New York until the individual complies with the
statutory registration requirements and obtains a vehicle disman-
tler's license.47
It has been argued that chop shops are not a closely regulated
industry in New York because the state lacks a long history of
chop shop regulation and because the regulatory scheme is not
"I See Burger, 482 U.S. at 708. Former Governor Carey noted that in 1976 over 130,000
cars were stolen resulting in losses of over $225 million. Id. As a result, premiums for
comprehensive car insurance in New York were significantly higher than the national aver-
age. Id. Furthermore, automobile theft has become a major social problem, putting tre-
mendous economic and personal hardship on the citizens of different states. Id. See also Ost,
127 Misc. 2d at 187, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 486 ("auto thefts have reached epidemic propor-
tions"); National F.O.P. Launches Auto Theft Prevention Program, PR Newswire, Feb. 15,
1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library) (one auto theft occurs every twenty seconds amounting to
4,000 thefts nationally per day); Auto Theft Costs U.S. Insurers Eight Billion Dollars, Reuters,
Feb. 12, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library). In 1989, over 1.5 million automobiles were stolen in
the United States, costing auto insurers more than $8 billion. Id. The rate of automobile
thefts in the United States increased 41.8 percent from 1985-1989. Id. According to the
National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB), the cost of this problem is increasing about
10 percent each year. d.; Vehicle Theft in 1988 Soars to 11.2 Percent, The National Under-
writer Company; Property & Casualty/Employee Benefits Edition, Nov. 6, 1989 (LEXIS,
Nexis library). During 1988, vehicle thefts skyrocketed to a record 1,432,916 nationally, an
increase of 11.2 percent from 1988. Id. This resulted in an estimated cost to the public of
$7 billion, including such items as law enforcement expenses for investigation and prosecu-
tion. Id. In 1988, there were also 2.7 million auto-related crimes involving thefts of auto-
mobile contents or parts. Autoweek, Oct. 16, 1989, at 9 (LEXIS, Nexis library).
In 1984, car thefts cost insurance companies about $4.5 billion nationally. United Press
International, Jul. 31, 1984 (LEXIS, Nexis library). As a consequence, insurance companies
pass the cost on to consumers in the form of increased premiums. Id. Furthermore, the
insurance companies and the public bear an additional burden because only about 11 of
every 1,000 cars stolen are ever recovered. Id.
4' Burger, 482 U.S. at 709 n.20.
" See supra note 22 and accompanying text (statutory registration requirement). The
application for registration as a vehicle dismantler must contain "a listing of all felony con-
victions and all other convictions relating to the illegal sale or possession of a motor vehicle
or motor vehicle parts, and a listing of all arrests for any such violations by the applicant
and any other person required to be named in such application." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
415-a(2) (McKinney 1986). The fee for registration is $50. Id., § 415-a(3). A registration
will not "be issued or renewed unless the applicant has a permanent place of business at
which the activity requiring registration is performed which conforms to section one hun-
dred thirty-six of the general municipal law . . ." and "the applicant and any persons hav-
ing a financial interest in the business have been determined by the commissioner to be fit
persons to engage in such business." Id., § 415-a(4)(a) (McKinney 1986).
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sufficiently pervasive."8 The duration of the regulatory scheme in
question has been held to be an important factor in determining
whether the industry has been closely regulated.' 9 However, the
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the duration of regula-
tion of an industry is not dispositive. 0 In Dewey, the Court posited
a situation where a new or emerging industry, such as nuclear
power, posing tremendous health and safety concerns, could
never be subject to warrantless inspections simply because regula-
tion of that industry is of "recent vintage."51 The Court did not
endorse such a view, stating that absurd results would occur if the
length of regulation were the only criterion for evaluating the
closely regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement.52
It is submitted that, as the area sought to be regulated becomes
a greater social and economic problem to the citizens of the state,
the length of time the subject area has been regulated becomes
less significant in determining whether warrantless searches are
permissible. It is further suggested that when the legislature de-
termines that an industry is permeated with criminal activity and
in dire need of regulation, the fact that the implementing regula-
tions are only recent amendments should not preclude a finding
that the industry in question is closely regulated. Although chops
" Burger, 482 U.S. at 719-21 (Brennan,J., dissenting). See Comment, Id., supra note 43,
at 365 (chop shops do not have history of close regulation). But see Burger, 482 U.S. at 703-
04 (junkyards or chop shops are closely regulated businesses in New York State); People v.
Garcia, 111 Misc. 2d 550, 554, 444 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981)
(same) (citing People v. Tinneny, 99 Misc. 2d 962, 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1979)); Comment, Discord Among Federal Courts of Appeals: The Constitutional-
ity of Warrantless Searches of Employers' OSHA Records, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 217 (1990)
(same) (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 703).
" Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981)). Several
commentators have discussed the Supreme Court's proposition that the regulatory
schemes' duration is an important factor in this area. See Brannigan & Ensor, Speech and the
First Amendment: Did Bose Speak Too Softly?: Product Critiques and the First Amendment, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 583 (1986); Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEo. L.J. 699, 781 (1990);
Project, Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 489, 589 (1989); Note, The National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Random Drug-Testing, and the Applicability of the Administrative Search Ex-
ception, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 661 n.124 (1989) ("duration of the regulatory scheme is
still a relevant factor").
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shops have been a relatively recent area of regulation in New
York, they are a closely regulated industry.
B. New York's Substantial Interest
Having concluded that chop shops are a closely regulated indus-
try, it is necessary to apply the three criteria set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Burger to determine whether a
warrantless search of a closely regulated industry is reasonable. 53
First, the regulatory scheme in question must serve a "substantial"
governmental interest. 54 The conclusion that a sovereign entity
has a substantial interest in curbing auto theft is inescapable.65
The New York Legislature recognized that auto theft has become
a multimillion dollar industry which creates an "intolerable eco-
nomic burden" on the public and insurance companies.6 There is
'3 See supra note 9 (fourth amendment reasonableness test for warrantless inspection in
closely regulated industries).
Id. (same).
" See Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-09. The legislature amended VTL § 415-a(5) in response
to the economic burdens inflicted upon citizens of New York by auto theft. Id. See also
1979 N.Y. Laws 1826, 1826-27. "stolen automobiles are often used in the commission of
other crimes and there is a high incidence of accidents resulting in property damage and
bodily injury involving stolen automobiles." Id.; People v. Robles, 124 Misc. 2d 419, 422,
477 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984) (state contended VTL § 415-a aimed
at decreasing auto theft and costs to insurance companies and public); People v. Camme,
112 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 447 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982) (thefts and
costs to insurance companies and public will be decreased by making it more difficult to
traffic stolen vehicles and parts); People v. Garcia, 111 Misc. 2d 550, 556, 444 N.Y.S.2d
548, 552 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981) (same). Several commentators have discussed Bur-
ger's holding that states have a substantial interest in reducing auto theft. See Comment,
Warrantless Searches of Commercial Premises: An Unwarranted Intrusion, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J.
501, 520-21 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Warrantless Searches] (when industry poses no
danger to public health or safety, commercial property owner's right to be free from un-
reasonable searches outweighs any justification state can offer for warrantless search); Com-
ment, Search and Seizure: New York v. Burger: Can an Administrative Search Be Used to Un-
cover Evidence of a Crime?, 56 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 617, 624, 631 (1988) [hereinafter
Comment, Search and Seizure] (Burger Court understood state's concern in decreasing auto
theft). But see Note, The 'Administrative' Search from Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth
Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 283-84 (1989). The Burger Court's "substantial
interest" analysis is criticized because while regulation of the junkyard industry may curb
auto theft, it will not decrease the number of automobile accidents nor will it deter thieves
from using stolen cars to commit other crimes. Id.
" See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing economic impact of auto theft on
insurance companies and citizens of New York). See also 2 Indicted as Heads of Chop Shops,
Chicago Tribune, Sep. 3, 1987 (LEXIS, Nexis library). According to the National Auto
Theft Bureau, car thefts have been increasing at an annual rate of 6 percent. Id. In 1986, 1
million automobiles were stolen in the United States, costing the public about $5 billion in
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no question that auto theft in New York State has been rapidly
increasing.5" In the three years prior to the amendment of section
415-a(5), one hundred thirty thousand cars were stolen in New
York State, resulting in losses in excess of 225 million dollars."
The legislature's amendment of section 415-a(5) was a direct re-
sponse to this alarming statistic." Governor Carey's statements in
support of the amendment reflect the legislature's intention that
section 415-a(5)(a) would curb auto theft by making it more diffi-
cult to fence stolen vehicles and parts.6"
C. Section 415-a(5Xa) Substantially Serves New York's Interest
The regulation of the chop shop industry reasonably serves
New York's substantial interest in curbing auto theft.61 It is well
established that discouraging the middleman or receiver of stolen
property is an effective method of combating theft in general."2
increased insurance premiums and law enforcement expenditures. Id.; Car Thieves Find Ha-
ven Near Malls, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 28, 1986 (LEXIS, Nexis library). Although the
number of car thefts occurring in suburbs exceeds most other serious crimes, citizens ap-
pear to be more concerned with these other crimes. Id. This reduced public concern for
car theft exists despite the fact that each auto theft costs the car owner or insurer an aver-
age of $4,000. Id.; Car Thefts Soar-But Few Are Punished, United Press International, Mar.
19, 1982 (LEXIS, Nexis library). According to State Farm, the nation's largest automobile
coverage writer, the average cost to insure a car for theft has more than doubled in the last
ten years. Id.
" See Burger, 482 U.S. at 708 (recognizing increased incidence of auto theft in New
York). See also Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 180-81 n.3, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 743 n.3. The Chairman of
the Senate Committee which issued a comprehensive report on auto theft stated that auto-
mobile theft in New York State had risen to alarming proportions. Id. Furthermore, New
York's auto theft rate continued to increase with the number of car thefts in New York
comprising 10 percent of the national total. Id. The Committee noted a 14 percent rise im
reported thefts between 1975 and 1976 and concluded that the New York Metropolitan
area had been targeted by professional automobile theft rings. Id.; People v. Tinneny, 145
Misc. 2d 737, 739, 547 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1989) (noting
increased auto theft in New York); At Last Free of Cars and Insurers Delays, N.Y. Times, Jul.
2, 1980 (LEXIS, Nexis Library) (In 1979, 110,881 motor vehicles reported stolen in New
York State).
" 1979 N.Y. Laws 1826, 1826-27.
9 See Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-09 (noting increase in auto theft prompted amendment of
VTL § 415-a(5)).
"0 Burger, 482 U.S. at 708 n. 20. See Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d at 739, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 800
(§ 415-a aimed at eliminating car theft); People v. Camme, 112 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 447
N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982) (§ 415-a amended in order to reduce
auto thefts and costs to insurance companies).
" Burger, 482 U.S. at 709. See infra notes 62-64 (chop shops are market for stolen auto
parts).
" See Burger, 482 U.S. at 709. It is well known that the auto theft problem can be ap-
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Chop shops have been, and presently are, a primary conduit for
the trafficking of stolen vehicles and parts."3 The New York Legis-
lature amended section 415-a(5) with the intent to frustrate the
ability of the middleman to market stolen goods."' It believed that
the state could reduce auto theft by implementing regulations
which trace the origin and destination of vehicle parts.6 5
proached effectively by controlling the receiver of, or market in, stolen property. Id. Theft
would not be profitable without professional receivers of stolen property. Id. (citing W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8.10, p.7 65 (2d ed. 1986)). Furthermore, the middle-
man or professional receiver inspires 95 percent or more of the auto theft in the United
States. Id. (citing 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 789 (Kadish ed. 1983)). Chop
shops provide the major market for stolen automobiles and parts. Id. (citing Letter from
Paul Goldman, Counsel, State Consumer Protection Board, to Richard A. Brown, Counsel
to the Governor (June 29, 1979)). Therefore, it is rational for the state to believe that it
will curb auto theft through regulations that prevent chop shops from becoming markets
for stolen cars and that help trace the origin and destination of automobile parts. Id.
Several commentators have also noted that controlling the middleman or receiver can
effectively reduce theft. See Comment, Warrantless Searches of Commercial Premises: An Un-
warranted Intrusion, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 501, 514 n. 106 (1987) (problem of auto theft effec-
tively contained by controlling receiver of stolen property). See also Langbenn, Shaping the
Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial: A view from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65
(1983) ("[i]f there were no receivers There would be no thieves") (quoting H. FIELDING, AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS 106 (London 1751)).
" See Burger, 482 U.S. at 709 ("Automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantlers provide
the major market for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts."). See also United States v. Domin-
guez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991) (warrantless searches of chop shops deter
receiving and marketing of stolen goods); Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 180, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 743
(legislature found chop shops to be influenced by lucrative trade in stolen automobiles and
parts); People v. Brigante, 131 Misc. 2d 708, 711, 501 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1986) ("many junkyards, body shops and dismantlers are little more than fronts or
essential elements of stolen car rings .... "); Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d at 739, 547 N.Y.S.2d at
800 (problem of theft is associated with vehicle dismantling industry); People v. Pace, 101
App. Div. 2d 336, 342-43, 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 447 (2d Dept. 1984) (Mangano, J., dissent-
ing) (criminal possession of stolen property is associated with chop shop industry), affd, 65
N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985); People v. Garcia, 111 Misc. 2d at
556, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 552 (chop shop industry must be closely regulated to prevent traffick-
ing in stolen autos and parts).
" Burger, 482 U.S. at 708 n.20. See 1979 N.Y. Laws 1826, 1827 (by making it tougher to
traffic in stolen cars and parts, auto theft will be decreased); See also People v. Robles, 124
Misc. 2d 419, 422, 477 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984) (prosecution ar-
gued that amendment to § 415-a allowed police to conduct warrantless searches of chop
shops which would decrease auto theft); People v. Camme, 112 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 447
N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982) (amendment to § 415-a was aimed at
closely regulating chop shops to reduce theft); People v. Martinelli, 117 Misc. 2d 310, 317,
458 N.Y.S.2d 785, 790 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1982) (amendment to § 415-a allows police
to inspect chop shops' records and premises which will have effect of trimming market for
stolen autos and parts); Garcia, 111 Misc. 2d at 554, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52 (§ 415-a and
amendments require junkyards to maintain record keeping systems so that stolen autos can
be traced to them).
" See 1979 NY. Laws 1826, 1827.
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It is submitted that warrantless inspections pursuant to section
415-a(5)(a) are necessary to further the regulatory goal of cur-
tailing auto theft. Mandating a warrant would frustrate the pur-
pose of the statute," since stolen vehicles and parts pass quickly
from the thief through the chop shops."1 Consequently, frequent
and unannounced inspections are crucial if this regulatory scheme
is to succeed in deterring auto theft."8
See Burger, 482 U.S. at 710 (warrant requirement could easily frustrate inspection of
chop shops by putting owners on notice); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 356 (1985)
(time constraints make getting warrant either impossible or extremely impracticable); Don-
ovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1980) (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972)) (for effective inspection, frequent unannounced inspections are essential -
warrant could easily frustrate inspection under Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977);
United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991) (warrantless inspec-
tions of junkyards needed to deter receiving and marketing of stolen goods), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 2063 (1991); United States v. Goff, 677 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (D. Utah 1987)
(warrant requirement could easily frustrate inspection of chop shop premises); Dunlop v.
Hertzler Enter., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D.N.M. 1976) (same); People v. Rizzo, 40
N.Y.2d 425, 431, 353 N.E.2d 841, 845-46, 386 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882 (1976) (Jasen, J., dis-
senting) (same); People v. Hedges, 112 Misc. 2d 632, 635, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010 (Dist.
Ct. Suffolk County 1982) (same). But see Burger, 482 U.S. at 722 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (warrantless searches not needed and warrant should be obtained ex parte to keep
element of surprise); Note, supra note 54, at 289 (if surprise element is needed then ex
parte warrants should be considered).
" New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) ("[sjtolen cars and parts often pass
quickly through an automobile junkyard"). See Note, supra note 55, at 279-80 (same); Com-
ment, Search and Seizure, supra note 55, at 624 (same); Comment, Warrantless Searches,
supra note 54, at 514 (same). The ability of car theft rings to transfer or sell stolen cars and
parts to chop shops and junkyards is essential to this criminal enterprise. See Bionic Auto
Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1983).
:8 Burger, 482 U.S. at 710 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 356 (same); Balelo v. Baldrige 724 F.2d 753, 764 (9th Cir. 1984)
(same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Goff, 677 F. Supp. at 1535 (same); Euster v.
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 828, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (appel-
lant was aware that by enteriing closely regulated industry he would be subjected to fre-
quent and unannounced inspections); Rizzo, 40 N.Y.2d at 431, 353 N.E.2d at 846, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 882 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (frequent unannounced visits crucial in making in-
spections serve as credible detriment to auto thefts); People v. McIver, 125 A.D.2d 263,
264, 508 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (1st Dept. 1986) (under §415-a authorities may make unan-
nounced visits to examine owner's books and records). Several commentators have ad-
dressed the need for frequent unannounced visits to junkyards. See George, United States
Supreme Court 1986-1987 Term: Criminal Law and Procedural Decisions, 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
193, 210 (1988) (random, frequent and unannounced inspections are needed to further
regulating scheme); Note, Putting the 'Super' into Superfund's Entry and Inspection Provisions:
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 437, 442 (1987) (government could
only enforce statute through frequent unannounced inspections). Contra, Comment, supra
note 43, at 346 n.65 (Burger's requirement of frequent and unannounced inspections un-
dermines fourth amendment by sacrificing warrant's protections for administrative
convenience).
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D. Constitutionally Adequate Substitute for a Warrant
Since section 415-a(5)(a) authorizes a warrantless search pursu-
ant to an administrative inspection, the statute must establish an
adequate procedural substitute for a warrant to prevent unconsti-
tutional governmental intrusions.69 According to the Supreme
Court, the statute must fully inform the owner of the commercial
business that he is subject to possible searches and it must "limit
the discretion of the inspecting officer." 0 To satisfy these two re-
quirements, the statute must be so clearly defined that an owner is
fully aware that his property is subject to periodic inspection and
"carefully limited in time, place and scope.' '71
Section 415-a(5)(a), authorizing the administrative, warrantless
search provides:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any po-
lice officer and during his regular and usual business hours, a
vehicle dismantler shall produce such records and permit said
agent or police officer to examine them and any vehicles or
parts of vehicles which are subject to the record keeping re-
quirements of this section and which are on the premises.
7 2
The Supreme Court has held that this statute complies with con-
stitutional requirements.7 3 The statute fully informs the owner
that his premises are subject to periodic inspections,7 4 and specifi-
69 Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.691, 711 (1987) (§ 415-a
provides constitutionally adequate substitute for warrant); People v. Sessions, 170 A.D.2d
704, 567 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (2d Dept. 1991) (same); People v. Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d 737,
739, 547 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 800 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1989) (same); Comment,
Search and Seizure, supra note 54, at 624 (same). But see Burger, 482 U.S. at 718 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (warrant needed under § 415-a); Comment, The 'Junking' of the Fourth Amend-
ment: the Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
791, 810-11 (1988).
70 Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.
" Id. See also Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 (statute must provide comprehensive and predict-
able inspection scheme); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (same).
72 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986).
Burger, 482 U.S. at 718 (statute held constitutional).
14 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986) (police officer or agent may
examine owner's records during "regular and usual business hours") see also Burger, 482
U.S. at 711 (statute informs chop shop owner that inspections will be made on regular
basis).
374
Vol. 6: 357, 1991
People v. Keta
cally defines the record keeping requirements.' It limits the per-
sonnel permitted to conduct an inspection to police officers or au-
thorized agents of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles7' and
restricts the scope of the inspection to the owner's records and
inventory which are subject to the record keeping requirements."
It has been argued that the statute is not sufficiently limited in
"time, place, and scope" because it neither requires nor limits the
number of searches that might be conducted of a given chop.
shop.7 ' However, if the statute were to establish a set pattern and
frequency of inspections, a sophisticated chop shop owner would
be able to predict their occurrence and defeat the regulatory goal
of the statute.7 1 It is submitted that frequency and unpredictabil-
ity of chop shop inspections are necessary elements to aid the gov-
ernment in curtailing auto theft. Since the statute sufficiently lim-
its the inspection to "regular and usual business hours," 80 a chop
shop owner can expect the inspection to occur during the normal
course of business, leaving unknown only the specific day that it
will take place.8 " Thus, section 415-a(5)(a) is clearly defined in the
state constitution and sufficiently limited in time, place, and
71 N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW §415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986); see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 711
(§ 415-a(5)(a) clearly explains how chop shop owner must comply with statute).
r N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW §415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986).
" Id.; see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 711-12.
7' Burger, 482 U.S. at 722 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[t]here is neither an upper nor a
lower limit on the number of searches that may be conducted at any given operator's estab-
lishment in any given time period"). But see id. at 711. The "time, place and scope" of the
inspections is restricted to place appropriate restraints upon the inspecting officer's discre-
tion. Id. Officers can only perform inspections during regular and usual business hours. Id.
Furthermore, only vehicle-dismantling and related industries can be inspected. Id. Finally,
the scope of these searches is restricted because the inspectors may scrutinize the records
and any autos or parts which are subject to the record keeping requirements of § 415-a
and which are on the owner's property. Id. at 711-12; People v. Tinneny, 145 Misc. 2d
737, 739, 547 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 800 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1989) (§ 415-a(5) is suffi-
cient in time, place and scope); People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 493 N.E.2d 926,
927, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (1986) (same), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); People v. Burger,
125 Misc. 2d 709, 710, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 936; 938 (Sup. Ct, Kings County 1984) (same), affid,
112 A.D.2d 1046, 493 N.Y.S. 2d 34 (2d Dep't 1985), rev'd, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d
926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y. 2d
828, 518 N.E.2d 1, 523 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1987).
11 See supra notes 64-66 (explaining element of surprise).
:0 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW §415-(a)(5)(a) (McKinney 1986).
8' See People v. Keta, 165 A.D.2d 172, 182, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738, 744 (2d Dept. 1991);
supra note 69 (VTL § 415-(a)(5)(a) requirements).
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scope.8"
II. INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS
The United States Constitution establishes the minimum thresh-
old of individual liberties which both the federal and the state
governments must protect. 83 Each state, through enactment of its
own constitution and statutes, has the sovereign authority to grant
greater protection to an individual's privacy rights than required
under the United States Constitution.8 ' A state court is obligated
62 See supra note 76 (same).
'3 See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867, 867 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). State
courts have traditionally looked to the federal courts for leadership in the area on individ-
ual rights. Id. at 870. When the United States Supreme Court has expanded individual
liberties in an area, state courts have followed and even occasionally interpreted state con-
stitutional rights to be greater than the minimum level of rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. Id.; See also Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 570 n.28 (W.D. Va.
1988), affd, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 74 (1990). "The protec-
tions afforded by the United States Constitution must be considered a floor, so that no
state constitution may be read to afford protections less potent than those contained in the
federal constitution. However, the guarantees of the federal constitution are not a ceiling."
Id.; accord Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986):
The Supreme Court's role in construing the Federal Bill of Rights is to establish
minimal standards for individual rights applicable throughout the Nation. The func-
tion of the comparable provisions of the State Constitution, if they are not to be
considered purely redundant, is to supplement those rights to meet the needs and
expectations of the particular State.
Id.
Several authors have addressed the minimum level of protection of individual liberties
that the federal constitution affords. See Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Re-
straint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 344 n.171 (1989)
(state decisions which offer less protection than afforded under federal constitution are
open to Supreme Court review); Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 725 n. 320 (1988) (state constitu-
tion may grant more protection to individual rights than federal constitution, but not less
protection) (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)); Turk-
ington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable
Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Response to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 ViL..
L. REV. 1299, 1321 (1987) (supremacy clause of federal constitution places floor, but not
ceiling, on state court's interpretation of individual rights); Note, Miranda and the State
Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986) (federal constitution
guarantees minimum level of rights below which no state may venture in interpreting its
own laws); Comment, Arrest and Search Powers of Special Police in Pennsylvania: Do Your Con-
stitutional Rights Change Depending on the Officer's Uniform?, 59 TEMP. L. Q. 497, 509 n. 65
(1986) (states can not provide criminal defendants with less protection than is guaranteed
by federal constitution).
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). It is well established
that a state has the right "to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expan-
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to follow Supreme Court precedent when its determination of is-
sues is based solely upon federal statutes or the federal constitu-
tion.8" However, a state court may decide an issue under its own
state constitution by applying an independent, non-federal analy-
sis, and create an umbrella of protection more encompassing than
that provided by the Supreme Court.8" When the language of a
federal statute or the Constitution differs from a similar state pro-
vision, a state may elect to interpret the state version independent
of the federal analysis of the federal version, provided that it's
interpretation is not violative of federal law. 87 Where the lan-
guage of a federal provision is identical, the New York courts
have employed a non-interpretative analysis to determine if the
language would have a separate application peculiar to New York
citizens. 88
sive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id.; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967). "Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher
standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses
to do so." Id.; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 384, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1943). See also
Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 570 (W.D. Va. 1988) (same), affd, 895 F. 2d. 953
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 74 (1990); NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F. Supp. 195,
206 (D. Md. 1986) (same); United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (E.D. Pa.
1983) ("undoubtedly, states may impose higher 'standards on searches and seizures' than
required by the United States Constitution), affid without opinion, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (state constitutions often afford greater
protection to individual rights than federal constitution); Levit, The Caseload Conundrum,
Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation ofJurisdiction, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 321, 344
(1989) (presumption in favor of Supreme Court review only becomes important when state
court gives individual rights more protection than would be available under the United
States Constitution).
a People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 301-02, 501 N.E.2d 556, 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907, 911 (1986), cert.denied, New York v. P.J. Video Inc., 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). "State
courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court when reviewing federal statutes or
applying the Federal Constitution." Id. at 301-02, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S. 2d at
911.
"6 See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81 (states can find broader individual rights on independent
state grounds); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-38 (1983) (same).
87 People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 80, 555 N.E.2d 915, 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 525
(1990) (Simons, J, concurring) "Briefly, if the language of the Federal provision and its
State counterpart differ, then the State court after examining the State provision and its
textual and historical differences, may conclude that it should be construed otherwise than
the Federal provision." Id.
88 Id. "Even if the language of the two provisions is the same, however, the court may
conclude that a different construction is in order because of noninterpretative considera-
tions". Id. See People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702
(1991); Bonventre, Beyond the Reemergence - "Inverse Incorporation" and Other Prospects for
State Constitutional Law, 53 ALB. L. REV. 403, 407-12 (1989).
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The language of the fourth amendment is identical to article I,
section 12 of the New York Constitution. 9 The court of appeals
has held that the identity of language between the fourth amend-
ment and article I, section 12 "supports a policy of uniformity be-
tween the State and federal courts."9 Thus, the court of appeals
does not "disregard the Supreme Court's decisions merely be-
cause it disagrees with them or dislikes the result reached." 91
However, federal-state uniformity is only one factor "to be bal-
anced against other considerations that may argue for a different
state rule."9 Specifically, the court of appeals has distinguished
article I, section 12 from its federal equivalent, when the "analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to
undercut the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable
government intrusions."9 Utilizing the non-interpretative analy-
sis, the New York courts look for: any pre-existing state statutory
or common law defining the scope of the individual right in ques-
tion; the history and traditions of the State in its protections of
the individual right; any identification of the right in the New
York State Constitution as being one of peculiar state or local con-
cern; and any distinctive attitudes of the state citizenry toward the
definition, scope or protection of the individual right.94 After ana-
lyzing these criteria, the court. would decide whether to grant a
89 p.j. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (1986) ("[The
history of § 12 supports the presumption that the provision 'against unlawful searches and
seizures.., conforms with that found in the 4th Amendment, and this identity of language
supports a policy of uniformity between State and Federal courts.' " (quoting People v.
Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (1985))), cert.
denied, New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
90 People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624
(1985). The court has sought to fashion search and seizure rules that promote consistency
in the interpretation given to identical clauses. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386,
389-90, 465 N.E.2d 823, 477 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (1984) (inventory search of closed con-
tainers); People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59
(1981) (automatic standing rule); People v. Roman, 53 N.Y.2d 39, 422 N.E.2d 554, 439
N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981) (inventory search of cigarette case).
9' People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 80, 555 N.E.2d 915, 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 525
(1990) (Simons, J., concurring).
" P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912 cert. denied,
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
03 People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 24, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 391
(1990), cert. denied, Dunn v. New York, 111 S.Ct. 2830 (1991).
" People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907,
911 (1986).
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broader construction of the identical language based on state
grounds. 98
In People v. Keta, the appellate division, second department, ap-
plied the non-interpretative analysis and determined that article I,
section 12 does not grant greater protection than the fourth
amendment to persons engaged in the chop shop industry. 91 The
court held that New York's "peculiar State or local concern" is
regulation of the chop shop industry.9" According to the court,
section 415-a(5)(a) affects a relatively small number of businesses
which are notoriously involved in the multimillion dollar auto
theft and stolen parts industry.98 Consequently, a chop shop
owner does not have a heightened privacy interest which has tra-
ditionally been afforded greater protection in New York.9" The
court held that New York has a greater interest in stopping the
trafficking of stolen cars and parts than in expanding the fourth
amendment's protection of a chop shop owner. 10
The court of appeals has found a broader scope of protection
within the New York Constitution and statutes in several areas,
such as due process limits on police conduct,' 0 ' right to counsel,'0 2
mental patient rights, 03 urine testing,10 4 freedom of the press,1 0 5
98 Id.





101 See People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert.
denied, Dunn v. New York, 11 S.Ct. 2830 (1991). The court of appeals has held that a
"canine sniff', conducted without a warrant or probable cause, by a specially trained nar-
cotics detection dog, was an unreasonable intrusion by the government under the New
York Constitution. Id. The court stated that "to hold otherwise, we believe would raise the
specter of the police roaming indiscriminately through the corridors of public housing
projects with trained dogs in search of drugs." Id.; see also People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d
511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78, 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 721 (1978) (boundaries of permissible
police conduct decided under state constitution).
10 See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
424 (1976) (right to assistance of counsel is grounded in state's constitution).
103 See Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81
(1986) (due process clause of New York State Constitution permits committed mental pa-
tients to refuse antipsychotic medication).
104 See Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70
N.Y.2d 57, 70, 510 N.E.2d 325, 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462 (1987). Compulsory urine
testing of school teachers was found to violate an individual's fundamental expectation of
privacy and to be an unreasonable search under both the New York and federal constitu-
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freedom of expression,106 and those cases involving "fundamental
rights which have been historically accorded a higher status in
New York and which affect a broad spectrum of the State's
citizenry". 07
In each of these cases, the State had a greater interest in ex-
panding constitutional protection than in regulating the individual
right in question. In this case, there is no long tradition or history
in New York to protect proprietors of chop shops. Section 415-
a(5)(a) creates a diminished expectation of privacy for such a pro-
prietor, and the safeguards of the fourth amendment are in place
to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions. It is therefore
suggested that the appellate division's analysis of the warrantless
inspection in Keta, correctly concluded that a chop shop is not en-
titled to greater protection than that accorded by the fourth
amendment.
Finally, it submitted that federal-state uniformity and the ab-
sence of an independent state ground outweigh any need for New
York to create a different rule for the closely regulated chop shop
industry than that already adopted by the Supreme Court.
tions. Id. The court stated "[b]y restricting the government to reasonable searches, the
State and Federal Constitutions recognize that there comes a point at which searches in-
tended to serve the public interest, however effective, may themselves undermine the pub-
lic's interest in maintaining privacy, dignity and security of its members." Id. The court
concluded that ". . . random searches conducted by the state without reasonable suspicion
are closely scrutinized, and generally only permitted when the privacy interests implicated
are minimal, the government's interest is substantial, and safeguards are provided to insure
the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subjected to unregulated discre-
tion." Id.
105 See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529, 523 N.E.2d 277, 282,
528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1988). In O'Neill, the New York Court of Appeals held that the New
York Constitution protected a journalist from compelled disclosure of non-confidential
photographs taken in the course of news gathering. Id. The court cited New York's long
history of freedom of the press and the state's "consistent tradition ... of providing the
broadest possible protection to the 'sensitive' role of gathering and disseminating news of
public events .... ." Id.
Io See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d
844, 848 (1986). The court of appeals has held that the closing down of an adult bookstore
to end illegal sexual acts by its customers on the premises infringes upon the bookstore's
New York constitutional right of freedom of expression. Id. The court stated "New York
has a long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and
supporting works which in other States would be found offensive to the community." Id.
107 Keta, 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dept. 1991). See Beach v. Shanley, 62





Section 415-a(5)(a) of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law falls
squarely within the closely regulated industry exception to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The State has a
compelling interest in curbing automobile theft and section 415-
a(5)(a) is a necessary administrative regulation designed to achieve
that end. Although in certain areas New York has traditionally
expanded protection of individual rights beyond the United States
Constitution, a chop shop owner's expectation of privacy is not,
and should not be, one of those areas.
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